Insights · Part 4 of the series
Where interference comes from
Not every satellite navigation failure is an attack: the sun and lawful neighbouring transmissions can degrade the signal too, and resilience cannot wait to find out which it was.
When satellite navigation goes wrong, it’s tempting to assume an attack.
Deliberate interference is real, as earlier pieces in this series have covered. But it is not the only source.
Start with space weather. In May 2024, the strongest geomagnetic storm in over two decades disturbed the atmosphere the GPS signal travels through, and high-precision receivers on US farms lost accuracy at the height of corn planting.
Some farmers stopped work entirely, and one dealership warned customers that rows planted during the storm might not line up with the machines’ stored maps when they returned later in the season. In December 2006, a burst of radio noise from the sun was strong enough to degrade GPS receivers across the sunlit side of the planet. No hostile actor was involved in either case.
Then there is man-made interference without malice. GPS signals are faint by the time they reach Earth, and lawful transmissions in nearby spectrum can interfere with their reception.
When the US communications regulator approved a ground-based 5G network in neighbouring spectrum in 2020, the Department of Defense formally objected, warning of interference with GPS receivers. The approval and subsequent dispute concern an interference risk, rather than an example of an actual outage. But they illustrate why deliberate attacks are only part of the picture.
The third source is the deliberate kind: jamming and spoofing, covered earlier in this series.
The distinction matters because the fix differs. But attribution takes time, and resilience cannot wait for it. The direct impact of any outage or consequential drift can range from reputational harm and regulatory investigation to real-world harm which can be far reaching.
Whatever the cause, the immediate priorities include cross-checking against independent sources, designing and deploying fallback procedures and knowing which systems are affected. Understanding the cause helps determine what happens next; it shouldn’t be a prerequisite for taking precautions.
It is also how we think about the problem at SkyShield, where we are developing compact, passive antenna technology intended to make GNSS reception more resilient in difficult signal conditions. The work is under development and subject to validation, and no single piece of hardware addresses every cause described here. Resilience comes in layers.
A question worth asking before it happens: if your position or timing data degraded tomorrow, would your plan depend on knowing why?