Insights · Part 3 of the series
Ships, Ports and the Taken-for-Granted Signal
Satellite interference at sea has become routine enough that governments and regulators now tell ships to be ready to navigate without the signal.
In January 2026, fourteen governments did something unusual. The coastal states of the Baltic and North Sea, including the UK, published an open letter to the international maritime community about satellite interference. Not a technical notice. A safety warning. Their words: ‘All vessels are at risk.’
The backdrop is that interference in European waters is now routine. Sweden’s transport agency counted 733 GPS jamming incidents by September 2025, against 55 in the whole of 2023. Ships in the Gulf of Finland have appeared on tracking maps sitting on land. Estonia has warned of unexpected failures in positioning and autopilot systems on ferry lanes used by dozens of passenger vessels a day.
Modern shipping runs on satellite position and timing: charts, autopilot, collision avoidance, port traffic management, distress calls. In October 2026 the Maritime and Coastguard Agency published new guidance, MGN 719, listing the systems at risk and telling operators to be ready to work without them.
What stands out is what the guidance asks for. It treats interference as a normal operating risk: know which of your systems depend on satellite data, be able to spot interference, and verify your position by independent means: radar, visual marks, dead reckoning when the satellite picture can’t be trusted.
Alternative technologies are under development, the MCA notes, but many won’t be available at scale in the near term. The resilience it asks for is procedural: drills, contingency plans, and crews practised in navigating without the signal.
Procedure is one layer of resilience; equipment is another. At SkyShield we are developing compact, passive antenna technology intended to improve the resilience of GNSS reception, and maritime and coastal operations are among the settings we are looking at. It is under development and subject to validation, and it would complement the seamanship the MCA asks for, not replace it.
None of this stops trade. Ships still sail and ports still work. But the quiet confidence satellite navigation provided is no longer guaranteed in every sea area, and the cost turns up as risk, caution and delay rather than headlines.
We have all discovered the huge strain put on the global economy by choke points such as the Strait of Hormuz (conduit for 20% of the world’s oil shipments). 80-90% of global trade is moved by sea. Missed bunkering slots, docking disruption and rising insurance costs accumulate along a supply chain, and combine to add cost and delay.
If your business moves goods by sea, a fair question: what does your supply chain assume about GPS?