Insights · Part 1 of the series

The Jamming Threat May Not Be What You Expect

Interference with satellite navigation is usually framed as electronic warfare, but some of the best-documented cases began with a driver who simply wanted to stop being tracked.

Talk about interference with satellite navigation and the assumption is often electronic warfare: hostile states, conflict zones, deliberate attacks on infrastructure.

I would start somewhere less dramatic. The van next to you.

In 2013, the Guardian reported roadside monitoring that detected up to ten GPS-jamming incidents a day at some locations. Experts estimated thousands of UK users. Among the motives they described: drivers avoiding employer tracking or concealing work outside permitted hours.

That is historical evidence, not a measure of today’s prevalence. But it exposes a problem that a warfare-only framing misses. Someone trying to disappear from their employer’s screen can interfere with other people’s navigation too. Their intention may be personal. The effects are not.

This was more than a theoretical risk. In a 2013 enforcement notice, the US Federal Communications Commission documented a driver whose jammer interfered with a GPS-based aviation navigation system during pre-deployment testing at Newark airport. He said he used it to block his employer’s vehicle tracker.

A private act of evasion had become someone else’s operational problem.

Jamming is dangerous in its own right. It can deny a receiver the satellite signals it needs. But spoofing creates a different failure: the receiver accepts counterfeit signals and supplies a plausible wrong answer instead.

University of Texas researchers demonstrated this at sea in 2013. They gradually steered a yacht hundreds of metres off its intended track using false GPS signals. Its navigation equipment raised no alarm; the electronic chart still showed a straight course.

A missing position invites doubt. A convincing false position may not.

I would not treat this as a contest between the lone driver and the hostile state, or claim that one explains most interference. The uncomfortable point is that neither the motive nor the scale of the actor tells us how serious the consequences will be.

It is part of the reason for SkyShield, where we are developing compact, passive antenna technology intended to make satellite navigation more resilient on smaller platforms. The work is still under development, and it will not be the whole answer. But it starts from the same observation: interference does not need a battlefield.

The question is wider than “what happens if someone attacks our navigation?”

What happens when someone nearby wants to stop being tracked? And what happens when our instruments keep answering, but the answer is wrong?

  • GNSS resilience
  • PNT policy

Sources

  • The Guardian (2013)
  • US Federal Communications Commission (2013)
  • University of Texas at Austin (2013)

An earlier version of this article was first published on LinkedIn by Piers Corfield. It has been lightly edited for this site.

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